Syllogistic Hysteria: How the CIA and the HUAC Propelled Public Fear of Communism

“The mood McCarthy seized on can almost be expressed as a syllogism. America is so powerful. Yet things are not going as we want them to. Ergo, we are being betrayed.”¹

In the post-World War II era, the growing political and social ideology of communism was no unfamiliar concept to the American public. Indeed, the fear of radical anarchists and Bolshevists dominating US labor unions had begun before World War I. A primary cause of the First Red Scare was nationalism. Nationalism created unity within a sovereign nation by encouraging the public to embrace a civic identity based on culture and politics. During the First Red Scare, Americans feared those who threatened the robust country’s national identity: far-left extremists. Moreover, the Bolshevik revolution, aiming to establish a communist regime, emanated in the Soviet Union, an ally of the US, around the 1920s. This current event and the rising nationalism in America provoked such concern that led to domestic, anticommunist federal investigations and prejudice towards any radical leftists. The worry soon subsided, but following WWII, as American nationalistic standards grew again, previous fears of communist subversion returned and ignited an explosion of propaganda, political intimidation, and manipulation in US political culture. The Second Red Scare was deemed far more complex as America’s international relationship with the Soviet Union became volatile. When this recalcitrant foreign issue confronted the victorious, invulnerable United States post World War II, the public was subjected to the consequence of great expectations: an illusion of omnipotence. Fear and doubt grew as the Soviet’s became more antagonized and exaggerated proposing a threat to American standards within the public sphere. During the Second Red Scare, politician Joseph McCarthy utilized the growing communist concern as an opportunity by conducting unfair investigations on alleged communists. This enduring, boisterous practice was known as McCarthyism, and it lasted years due to the doubtful, anticommunist environment. Many observed that such fear capitalized on by Senator McCarthy was assumed by international policy and relations or the disappointment of high expectations; however, American domestic politics and government organizations were also capable of fueling this concern through excessive controversies and encapsulated feelings of national betrayal and weakness. Following World War II in the United States of America, public fear and syllogistic inquisitions emphasized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the House of Un-American Activities (HUAC) created the perfect environment for Joseph McCarthy to expand upon and provoke mass hysteria.

The CIA’s position in the American government granted the agency unequivocal public trust during the Red Scare, further providing the CIA with unbridled influence that concealed their many errors and manipulations. The National Security Act of 1947 reinforced the implemented foreign policy along with military improvements as World War II ended and the United States and USSR’s relationship worsened. The act created the CIA with a mission “to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government.”² This description demonstrated the importance of foreign affairs to the agency’s mission. Foreign affairs during that time concerned the increasing tensions between the US and the Soviet Union; therefore, with the escalating fear of Soviet espionage, the CIA maintained a position of power that possessed the ultimate trust of Americans despite the agency’s eventual interference with many individual lives. During the Cold War, as public unease intensified, the CIA gained a more authoritative reputation as it became involved in domestic media, kindling a climate of fear and propaganda. Gerald R. Ford exemplified these efforts, noting that “The CIA would come in and paint the most scary picture possible about what the Soviets would do to us—we were going to be second-rate; the Soviets were going to be Number One.”³ Ford articulated that the agency villainized the Soviets to the American public, targeting the valued mindset of America’s overriding nation; trepidation would be provoked by the CIA strategically manipulating people’s high expectations and threatening disappointment. Their compelling influence over American culture was present in the various unwarranted investigations conducted and allegations made. These explorations disregarded the privacy and constitutional rights of many civilians; however accusation after accusation was pursued by the CIA for years. The Lattimore Case was a prime example of the agency’s partisan allegations. People suspected Owen Lattimore for his involvement in Soviet espionage when he booked a passage to France, allegedly planning a trip to the USSR. The CIA swiftly became entailed and messaged the State Department saying: “Owen Lattimore will leave on a trip to the USSR via Air France June twenty-one, nineteen fifty-two, arriving Paris June twenty-two, nineteen fifty-two. Date of travel to Kiev and Moscow via aero/flot are open. his tickets have been paid for and have been forwarded to him.”⁴ In a fragile time, the CIA claiming such a bold statement on supposed communist activity caused chaos in the public. Everything happened quickly, hence believable, and poor Lattimore’s individual was alienated by the government and the people. Nonetheless, on June 27, the New York Times released an article commenting, “‘A high State Department official said today that the Central Intelligence Agency had represented a false report that Prof. Owen Lattimore had planned to visit Moscow as a confirmed fact,’” and the CIA’s proof derived from “‘raw and unevaluated data,’ as C.I.A. officials had asserted privately.”⁵ This quote from the article depicts the CIA’s flaws, although the agency was deemed believable in an impactful position; the false reports and sketchy data commonly released from the CIA succeeding their many corrupt allegations were never questioned amidst hysterical times. Additionally, the agency emphasized on fear by keeping their information discreet. Mentioning the bare, unviable data remained a private matter by the officials. It was up to their reputation whether people would trust that evidence, and in the agency’s authoritative position monitoring communist activity, it was likely the public would. All the different factors of secrecy, trust, and emphasis on fear that pertained to the CIA further applied to other domestic organizations and primarily the HUAC, a thriving committee with widespread impact in the McCarthy era.

The House Un-American Activities Committee’s initial purpose of probing communist influence in the United States extended people’s trust towards the dependable committee and fear that kept the HUAC active despite their inequitable treatment of witnesses. As the spread of communism escalated, in 1938, the committee was created with a primary purpose of scrutinizing alleged communists “on the part of private citizens, public employees and organizations.”⁶ The granted control of the HUAC provided the power to completely disrupt a business or interfere with an individual’s life without governmental punishment. In terms of antagonizing communism and persuading public opinion, the “HUAC attempted to instil a public fear of insidious ‘un-Americanism’ by casting itself as the Constitutional protector of Americanism’s core values.”⁷ The quote illustrates a method the committee used placing itself in an invulnerable position where people recognized the HUAC’s fighting for American ideals and could be easily persuaded to distress threats of the national government: un-Americanism. The House, with its prime target as communism, gained a high reputation amidst the Red Scare, whilst the HUAC demonstrated skeptical, unlawful behaviors when questioning witnesses. Walter Gellhorn commented on the unfair system acknowledging that “the committee [had] persisted in spreading baseless or prejudiced testimony of sensational and irresponsible character all over the record and the press without giving those charged a fair chance to reply.”⁸ In this quote, Gellhorn remarks on the committee’s flaw: the unfair treatment of those being questioned which may result in critical information missing. An example of the HUAC’s defective inquiries was the Alger Hiss Case where former Communist Party member Whittaker Chambers—who admitted his involvement and joined the FBI after he left—adamantly accused American government official, Alger Hiss, for committing espionage. Scholar Robert k. Carr noted that if Chambers was questioned in a more vigorous attitude by the HUAC, the espionage hearings could “have uncovered significant bits of information concerning espionage in the government service that came to light only much later during the two Hiss Trials.”⁹ In such a position of power, the Committee was depended upon to provide various pieces of information; however, as proven in this quote, the HUAC contradicted the purpose of an ideal, mature organization who treated witnesses fairly. In terms of opposition, many failed to revoke the House due to its ultimate trust in the fearful environment. San Franciscans for Academic Freedom and Education (SAFE) was an organization contesting the HUAC, and on July 22, SAFE indicated their goals to rescind the committee: one being to “marshal sufficient community concern about the Committee’s purposes and procedures to effectively confine the Committee to its proper legislative functions and to prevent any infringement of First Amendment rights.”¹⁰ SAFE was cognizant of the HUAC’s contravention towards constitutional rights, and SAFE hoped for the revocation of a committee violating citizen’s virtue despite the heightened fear of communism. Consequently, Arthur Bierman, a leader of SAFE, voiced, “It was practically impossible to get anyone to come out against [HUAC],... The fear was visceral,” and he described individual’s reactions saying, “People would turn white. They would stutter.”¹¹ Bierman’s interpretation encapsulates how fear allowed the HUAC to run its course without prevention. Opposition to the committee failed as the HUAC continued for years emphasizing public doubt with methods of instilling fear and using their power to conduct unfair investigations. The Committee’s effect on the environment was similar to the CIA’s: they created hysteria in political culture through the cases they initiated, and this chaos allowed for one man to utilize the atmosphere as an opportunity.

The radical agitation and fear in the anticommunist environment presented the ideal opportunity for Joseph McCarthy to flourish and fuel the hysteria. McCarthyism outlined the volatile atmosphere in US political culture comprehending indications of far-left activity. Countless accusations by apprehensive civilians, opportunists, and even friends and family were encouraged by the country’s domestic subversion, and the various cases, particularly the Rosenberg Trial and the Hollywood Ten, strongly depicted the hysteria and manipulation of the McCarthy era with emphasis of the CIA and HUAC. The Rosenberg Trial involved Ethel and Julius Rosenberg existing as alleged communists with plans to commit espionage. Ethel was accused by her own brother, David Greenglass, of containing confidential information about Soviet atomic bombs, although Greenglass’s assertion lacked fine evidence to support his claims. Yet, in an era of dismay, the Rosenbergs received a trial anyway and not a fair one. The only piece of evidence that correlated with the conspiracy of Rosenberg’s criminal acts was the description of an atomic bomb being transported to the Soviet Union.¹² Immediately, people began accusing the couple of betraying the US, and propaganda backed the public’s retorts; in a New York Times article, U.S. Attorney Myles Lane asserted, “If the crime with which she, Ethel, is charged had not occurred, perhaps we would not have the present situation in Korea.”¹³ In this quote, the reference to the Korean War, a war destined to fuel the public’s concern of communism coming to America, exaggerated and antagonized Ethel and Julius, fabricating their ambitions and negatively adjusting the public’s reaction towards the Rosenberg’s cause. What about the trial seized historians’ attention was the death sentence. Ethel’s family deceived her and the government pressured her, and in the Foley Court, 1951, Judge Kaufman stated, “The defendants... placed their devotion to their cause above their own personal safety and were conscious that they were sacrificing their children should their misdeeds be detected.”¹⁴ After this statement, the Judge announced the Rosenberg’s sentence as death by the electric chair. He provided reasons for the execution by exploiting their personal life decisions and their devotions, painting them as traitors in simple terms of betraying their children. The Daily News released an article about the death sentence labeling the couple as spies, further emphasizing the conspiracy of their espionage to the public.¹⁵ Evidence of the fearful environment was supported by a single conspiracy that convicted two Americans to death. David Greenglass, the informant of Ethel’s alleged intentions, received little questioning towards the reasons of his incrimination, and, similar to the HUAC’s seldom questioning of Chambers, vital information was left behind containing potential evidence of Greenglass’s guilt. Propaganda labeling Ethel and Julius as antagonists manipulated people’s opinions and justified the sentence, resembling the CIA’s influence over public doubt. Traits of the CIA and HUAC in the environment of fear shaped the trial’s proceedings and sparked the notorious conviction of the Rosenberg couple, and unjust inquisitions alike continued, especially in Hollywood.

In the McCarthy era, the Hollywood industry exhibited numerous investigations imposed upon individuals, harming careers and threatening citizen’s constitutional rights. A particular case that was prominent to the public was the Hollywood Ten: ten people, employees of the filmmaking organization, refused to answer questions regarding their alleged past association with the Communist party. Alas, the Hollywood Ten were imprisoned after citing their constitutional right to freedom of speech and assembly, justifying their unforgiven silence. While their actions emphasized Americanism, their conviction demonstrated the unjust atmosphere penetrating constitutional protection. The irony was the HUAC’s presumed preservation of American values against un-Americanism, although the silent individuals who possessed constitutional rights were imprisoned for the supposed assertion of communist affiliation. Not only the Hollywood Ten, but many other employee’s faced similar treatment by the government system. American actress, Gale Sondergaard, was also convicted, and in a letter to the HUAC chairman, she expressed “I believe in freedom of speech and religion and association as described in our first amendment,” and added, “unfortunately our present Supreme Court has not seen fit to spell out its legal availability to us in our own days.”¹⁶ In her letter, Gale recognized the Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge the rights of individuals to speak as they wanted. This quote portrays the government during the McCarthy era: careless of individual values and motivated by public fear. In this environment, opportunists further targeted individuals; within the industry, people betrayed each other’s back, throwing out allegations and using the biased government’s aid. In the same letter, when she was accused, Gale described her understanding of these actions saying, “today I read that this particular inquisition is not directed against the industry but is directed at individuals... employers, having been guaranteed that they would not be personally involved, have given the committed carte blanche to attack individuals to their own purposes.”¹⁷ Gale’s input, similar to the Hollywood Ten, depicted injustice under a system that capitalized on justice and fairness within itself. Individuals had a disadvantage. However, people, such as employers, possessed the advantage to accuse someone without being interrogated. This idea provided opportunists in the Hollywood industry with great ascendancy. The multiple Hollywood occurrences displayed how certain information would stay discreet and questions would be avoided allowing accusations and unjust interrogations to flourish under the emphasis of government committees and agencies.

Inquisitions of domestic subversion and allegations of Soviet espionage and communist affiliations were mobilized by the CIA and HUAC in an unjust manner. The organizations utilized public fear to their advantage and conducted unfair investigations destroying careers and grasping the attention of opportunists. Joseph McCarthy, the man who—at the time—gained a great reputation in the government for throwing out these accusations, portrayed similar traits to the HUAC and the CIA. In a journal article concerning the CIA, it was noted that “there was no naive acceptance of official statements for McCarthy; the truth had to be hidden, conspiratorial, and manipulated by the Kremlin.”¹⁸ This description of McCarthy illustrated his idiosyncrasy that people seldom opposed but respected for the sake of the country. His personality aligned with that of the CIA and HUAC: manipulative, propaganda-based, and untruthful, and these destructive traits allowed for biased investigations without question. Throughout the Red Scare, the distinction of America’s domestic politics emphasizing this bias and doubt was unrecognizable due to fear and chaos. People could not help but devote unequivocal certitude due to the omnipresent manipulation of organizations and committees claiming they would protect American interests and uphold standards. The inspections of alleged communists and spies were conniving of individual lives as depicted through the HUAC’s prejudiced behaviors in questioning. Yet, the public mindset remained warped by the confidential truth as the CIA used unevaluated evidence. It was this emphasized fear that authorized the Rosenberg Case and the Hollywood industry accusations. The concern of America’s high expectations facing disappointment to Soviet espionage and people’s national identity becoming flawed aided the hysteria. With the CIA and HUAC propelling unease, the public permitted this irrationality with a blind eye. Conclusions drawn from biases and raw information incited a mood to be defined as a syllogism.